



LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER REDISTRICTING AS 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: ADDRESSING THE  
PROBLEM OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING  
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INTRODUCTION 
Partisan gerrymandering decreases the electoral accountability and 
responsiveness of legislative bodies and contributes to the polarization of 
American politics. When drawing the lines of new electoral district maps, 
legislators from the majority party have a strong interest, both collectively 
and individually, in manipulating the location and composition of these 
districts so as to entrench and extend their control over legislative bodies. 
This is in conflict with the public’s interest in electoral accountability and 
representative government. Moreover, allowing individual legislators to vote 
on matters that directly affect their own prospects for reelection—often 
determinatively—creates a clear conflict of interest with their legal and 
ethical responsibilities as public servants. 
This Essay examines legislative control over redistricting through the lens 
of conflicts of interest law and suggests a novel legal framework for addressing 
partisan gerrymandering. Part I starts by giving a brief overview of the 
history and legal landscape surrounding partisan gerrymandering before 
moving on to a discussion of the problem of legislative control over 
redistricting. Part II assesses the applicability of state conflicts of interest laws 
and constitutional provisions to the practice of legislative control over 
redistricting. Finally, Part III takes a close look at the Virginia General 
Assembly Conflicts of Interest Act and analyzes what a legal challenge under 
this statute might entail, including an assessment of potential remedies. 
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I. THE LAW AND POLITICS OF REDISTRICTING 
A. History and Legal Landscape 
The process by which legislative districts are drawn has received 
increasing scrutiny in recent years,1 but politicization of the redistricting 
process is as old as the Republic.2 The term “gerrymander” refers to a 
redistricting plan designed to benefit individual legislators or a particular 
political party. The phrase was coined in 1812 to describe a district formed in 
Essex County, Massachusetts, by then-Governor Elbridge Gerry that was so 
unnatural it resembled the shape of a salamander.3 Congress, recognizing 
potential for abuse, added to its sixth post-census Apportionment Act of 1842 
the requirement that states be split into single-member districts according to 
their apportionment, and that representatives “be elected by districts 
composed of contiguous territory.”4 This reform was followed in 1872 with the 
requirement that districts be, to the extent “practicable,” equal in population,5 
and in 1901 with the requirement that districts be “compact.”6 Many states, 
including Virginia, have separately adopted the requirement that their state 
legislative districts be “contiguous and compact.”7 
These qualities have never been strictly defined, however. In fact, the 
Supreme Court has held that politically motivated gerrymandering can be 
constitutional,8 in part because the Court has been unable to develop a 
judicially manageable standard for determining what might constitute an 
unconstitutional political or partisan gerrymander.9 As a result, litigation 
 
1 See generally J. Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform to 
Rein in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 543 (2010). 
2 See Thomas Rogers Hunter, The First Gerrymander?: Patrick Henry, James Madison, James 
Monroe, and Virginia’s 1788 Congressional Districting, 9 EARLY AM. STUD. 781, 782 (2011) (identifying 
Patrick Henry in 1789 as the first American politician to utilize the tool of gerrymandering). 
3 Emily Barasch, The Twisted History of Gerrymandering in American Politics, ATLANTIC (Sept. 
19, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/the-twisted-history-of-gerrymandering-
in-american-politics/262369/#slide2 [http://perma.cc/UZ5C-VKC7]. 
4 Ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491. 
5 An Act for the Apportionment of Representatives to Congress Among the Several States 
According to the Ninth Census, Ch. 11, § 2, 17 Stat. 28 (1872). 
6 An Act Making an Apportionment of Representatives in Congress Among the Several States 
Under the Twelfth Census, Ch. 93, § 3, 31 Stat. 733, 734 (1901). 
7 See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (“Every electoral district shall be composed of contiguous 
and compact territory and shall be so constituted as to give, as nearly as is practicable, representation 
in proportion to the population of the district.”). 
8 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“We conclude that neither 
Article I, § 2, nor the Equal Protection Clause, nor (what appellants only fleetingly invoke) Article 
I, § 4, provides a judicially enforceable limit on the political considerations that the States and 
Congress may take into account when districting.”). 
9 Id.; see also id. at 291 (“‘Fairness’ does not seem to us a judicially manageable standard. 
Fairness is compatible with noncontiguous districts, it is compatible with districts that straddle 
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involving redistricting has largely focused on the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and Section Two of the Voting Rights Act and 
has challenged the use of race in line-drawing and the discriminatory vote-dilution 
effects of specific redistricting measures.10 
Even in the context of race-based gerrymandering, however, the legal 
tools are limited. While the use of race in redistricting is generally subject to 
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause,11 so long as a legislature is 
at least plausibly motivated by the desire to segregate the electorate on partisan 
grounds rather than racial grounds, the Supreme Court has largely upheld the 
gerrymander.12 This has been the result even where the line-drawers were aware 
of the high correlation between race and partisan preference, and indeed may 
have expressly used race as a proxy for partisan preference.13 
Section Two of the Voting Rights Act prohibits redistricting and other 
voting-related measures that “result[] in a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to 
vote on account of race or color,” including measures that diminish the opportunity 
 
political subdivisions, and it is compatible with a party’s not winning the number of seats that 
mirrors the proportion of its vote. Some criterion more solid and more demonstrably met than that 
seems to us necessary to enable the state legislatures to discern the limits of their districting 
discretion, to meaningfully constrain the discretion of the courts, and to win public acceptance for 
the courts’ intrusion into a process that is the very foundation of democratic decisionmaking.”). 
However, the “Efficiency Gap,” which measures the number of votes “wasted” by each side, could 
serve as a manageable standard. See infra note 17 and accompanying text (describing the holding of 
a recent district court case based on the Efficiency Gap). 
10 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916-17 (1995) (invalidating a redistricting plan 
because “the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but 
not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined 
by actual shared interests, to racial considerations”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642, 650 (1993) 
(rejecting “redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be 
viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional 
districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification,” and recognizing that race-based 
gerrymandering “reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system of representative 
democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than 
their constituency as a whole”). 
11 The Equal Protection Clause “requires state legislation that expressly distinguishes among 
citizens because of their race to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.” 
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643. 
12 See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999) (“Our prior decisions have made clear 
that a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so happens that 
the most loyal Democrats happen to be black Democrats and even if the State were conscious of that 
fact.”); Bush v. Vera 517 U.S. 952, 968 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“If district lines merely correlate 
with race because they are drawn on the basis of political affiliation, which correlates with race, there 
is no racial classification to justify . . . .”). The Supreme Court may reconsider this precedent in two 
cases presently before it, Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections and McCrory v. Harris, 
challenging Virginia’s state legislative districts and North Carolina’s congressional districts, 
respectively. See generally Amy Howe, Argument Previews: Racial Gerrymandering Returns to the Court, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/11/argument-previews-racial-
gerrymandering-returns-to-the-court/ [http://perma.cc/6V8L-RFUX]. 
13 Hunt, 526 U.S. at 551. 
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of minority groups to “elect representatives of their choice.”14 In practice, this 
means that states are barred from diluting minority voting strength by 
drawing districts that either spread minority voters across multiple districts 
such that they do not constitute a majority in any district (known as 
“cracking”), or that concentrate the vast majority of minority voters into a 
few districts (“packing”).15 As a result, in jurisdictions with significant, 
geographically concentrated minority populations and a history of racially 
polarized voting, the Voting Rights Act essentially requires legislators to take 
race into account when drawing district lines. At the same time, however, the 
Court has forbidden these legislators from making race the “predominant 
factor” in a redistricting plan under the Equal Protection Clause.16 Legislators 
considering redistricting plans—and courts evaluating their 
constitutionality—may thus find it difficult to determine whether a particular 
plan’s use of race is permissible. 
Without an established standard for adjudicating the constitutionality of 
a partisan gerrymander,17 and with very narrow grounds upon which to 
challenge a partisan gerrymander achieved through the use of race in redistricting, 
the legal tools currently available for challenging partisan gerrymandering are 
limited. However, an examination of some of the problems caused by partisan 
gerrymandering points toward the applicability and potential efficacy of a 
novel legal framework rooted in government ethics law. 
 
14 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)–(b) (2012). 
15 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.11 (1986) (“Dilution of racial minority group 
voting strength may be caused by the dispersal of blacks into districts in which they constitute an 
ineffective minority of voters or from the concentration of blacks into districts where they constitute 
an excessive majority.”); id. at 80 (“The District Court in this case carefully considered the totality 
of the circumstances and found that in each district racially polarized voting; the legacy of official 
discrimination in voting matters, education, housing, employment, and health services; and the 
persistence of campaign appeals to racial prejudice acted in concert with the multimember 
districting scheme to impair the ability of geographically insular and politically cohesive groups of 
black voters to participate equally in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice.”). 
16 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916-18. 
17 It should be noted here that a three-judge federal district court panel in Wisconsin recently 
relied in part on a standard, the “Efficiency Gap,” which compares the number of votes “wasted” by 
each political party under a particular district map, in striking down redistricting efforts in 
Wisconsin. Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-CV-421, 2016 WL 6837229, at *9, *53 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2016). 
An Efficiency Gap of zero indicates a districting plan that favors neither major party—the number 
of “wasted” votes are the same for each—and the higher the Efficiency Gap, the more a particular 
plan favors one party over the other, thereby “impeding their [voters’] ability to translate their votes 
into legislative seats.” Id. at *56. Some experts believe the efficiency gap could serve as an objective 
standard by which the Supreme Court could measure political gerrymandering. Michael Wines, 
Judges Find Wisconsin Redistricting Unfairly Favored Republicans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/wisconsin-redistricting-found-to-unfairly-favor-republicans.html 
[http://perma.cc/M2HR-ZHLK]. 
2017] Legislative Control over Redistricting as Conflicts of Interest 151 
B. The Problem of Partisan Gerrymandering 
In any single member, winner-take-all system of legislative apportionment, 
the political composition of each district is a central determining factor of the 
overall composition of the legislative body. By packing large numbers of 
minority party voters into a small number of districts while simultaneously 
spreading the remaining minority party voters across a large number of 
majority-party-leaning districts, the majority party can artificially increase 
the overall number of seats it controls. Legislators can also use 
gerrymandering to entrench individual incumbents, or even to draw 
particular opponents out of their own districts—that is, they can redraw the 
district lines in such a way as to make it impossible for political rivals to win 
reelection in their district, or eliminate their district altogether by combining 
parts of it with neighboring districts and thus forcing them to run against 
another incumbent. 
Because the way in which districts are drawn has such a profound effect 
on the makeup of legislative bodies, and because redistricting generally occurs 
just once every ten years following the census, the political party in control 
of the state at that time has a huge incentive to redraw the districts in a way 
that will solidify and extend its control. In addition, as data and analysis on 
voting patterns and demographics become more sophisticated, the line-
drawers’ ability to maximize the electoral benefits of partisan gerrymandering 
continues to increase.18 This has had a number of negative effects on national 
and state politics. 
First, and perhaps most obvious, a politically gerrymandered legislative 
body is simply less representative of the political preferences of the overall 
population. Virginia presents a prime example. Contrary to its state 
constitutional requirement that districts be contiguous and compact, Virginia 
has, by some measures, the seventh-least compact districts in the nation.19 
This is a consequence of the extensive partisan gerrymandering that followed 
 
18 See generally Micah Altman et al., From Crayons to Computers: The Evolution of Computer Use 
in Redistricting, 23 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 334 (2005) (describing the ease with which computers 
can accomplish the goals of partisan line-drawers). 
19 See AZAVEA, REDRAWING THE MAP ON REDISTRICTING (2012), https://s3.amazonaws.com/ 
s3.azavea.com/com.redistrictingthenation/pdfs/Redistricting_The_Nation_Addendum.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
HM6H-GPF8] (noting that, depending on the measure employed, Virginia has either the fourth-, 
seventh-, or thirteenth-least compact districts). 
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the 2010 census, as reflected in both statistical measures20 and court 
documents filed by Republican state legislators.21 
The results are striking: although Democrats garnered 45.5% of the vote 
across the forty-three contested House of Delegates races in 2013, Democratic 
candidates won only eight of those forty-three seats.22 Similarly, despite 
Virginia’s Democratic congressional candidates receiving more than forty-seven 
percent of the vote statewide in 2012, they won only three out of eleven 
districts.23 This kind of result is, if not unconstitutional,24 at least grossly 
unrepresentative, and yet it is now the norm in state legislatures across the 
country.25 The antidemocratic effects of partisan gerrymandering are most 
conspicuously on display in the U.S. House of Representatives, where 
Republicans retained a sizeable 234–201 majority in 2012 despite Democratic 
congressional candidates receiving 1.4 million more votes.26 
Another problem that could result from gerrymandering—both partisan and 
bipartisan27—is that the creation of less competitive districts makes it safer for 
 
20 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the 
Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 879 fig.7, 890 (2015) (finding that Virginia’s congressional 
district map results in a gap of at least two seats between the expected and actual number of 
representatives elected by each party given the total number of votes cast for candidates from each party). 
21 See Brief of Intervenor-Defendants at 2, Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552 (E.D. 
Va. 2016) (No. 3:13-CV-678) (responding to a challenge based on a racial gerrymandering claim by 
citing “the Legislature’s overarching priorities of incumbency protection and preservation of cores 
to maintain the 8–3 partisan division established in the 2010 election” as guiding the design of its 
congressional district map). 
22 Josh Israel, How Gerrymandering Gave Virginia Republicans a House Supermajority, 
THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 14, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/11/14/2941931/gerrymandering-
virginia-republicans/ [http://perma.cc/67G6-R5Q6]. 
23 Id. 
24 Cf. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 571 (E.D. Va. 2015) 
(holding that Virginia’s redistricting plan did not violate the Equal Protection Clause), vacated on 
other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017). 
25 For instance, Democratic-controlled state legislatures in Illinois and Maryland enacted 
partisan gerrymanders which resulted in a twelve and twenty-six percentage point higher share of 
each state’s congressional delegation than their statewide share of the vote, respectively. Adam 
Serwer et al., Now That’s What I Call Gerrymandering!, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 14, 2012), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/11/republicans-gerrymandering-house-representatives-election-chart 
[http://perma.cc/8K6W-GRL6]. 
26 David Daley, The House the GOP Built: How Republicans Used Soft Money, Big Data, and High-Tech 
Mapping to Take Control of Congress and Increase Partisanship, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 24, 2016), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/04/gops-house-seats-are-safe-heres-why.html [http://perma.cc/ 
AUR2-AXCY]. 
27 Bipartisan gerrymandering refers to collusion between legislators from opposing parties in 
drawing districts that, while not changing the overall partisan makeup of the legislative body, 
entrench individual incumbents in their existing districts. See JUSTIN BUCHLER, HIRING AND 
FIRING PUBLIC OFFICIALS: RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF ELECTIONS 51-52 (2011) (“[T]he 
bipartisan gerrymander is the quintessential noncompetitive plan. Under a bipartisan gerrymander, 
voters from each party are packed into a set of safe districts. Thus there is one set of seats that the 
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legislators to adopt more extreme positions, resulting in gridlock and a lack of 
accountability on the part of the body as a whole.28 According to this theory, the 
certainty of one party’s control over a seat means the representative from that 
district can all but ignore minority party voters and representatives and move 
further towards one end of the political spectrum—and indeed often must do so 
or risk losing in the primary to a more ideologically extreme challenger.29 
In addition to these systemic problems, there are also clearly identifiable 
individual victims of partisan gerrymandering. Majority party leadership often 
targets the home districts of minority party leadership for reapportionment or 
dissolution to remove troublesome opponents from the legislative body by 
making their reelection all but impossible. One salient example involves 
former Democratic member of the Virginia House of Delegates, Ward 
Armstrong. Armstrong served for ten terms, representing District Ten from 
 
Democrats are guaranteed to win and another set that the Republicans are guaranteed to win, but 
very few (if any) that can be contested.”). 
28 The degree to which gerrymandering contributes to polarization in legislatures is heavily 
disputed. Compare Brief for Amici Curiae Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein in Support of 
Appellees at 16, Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) 
(No. 13-1314) (“The result is that Representatives increasingly find themselves in the partisan 
equivalent of an echo chamber—districts drawn on party lines assure them of electoral success 
without the need for cross-party compromise, and the increasing zeal of their most active 
constituents—the only voters to whom they feel accountable—pushes them into a contest for 
partisan orthodoxy within their parties.”), with Harry Enten, Why “Gerrymandering” Doesn’t Polarise 
Congress the Way We’re Told, GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2013/jan/03/gerrymandering-polarise-congress [http://perma.cc/6BFM-XRQU] (noting that entire 
states are becoming polarized, leading to safer districts, and that “[g]errymandering probably doesn’t 
help, yet it’s not the major cause of the [political polarization]”). 
29 See generally Brief for Amici Curiae of Mann and Ornstein, supra note 28. Although 
ideological extremism is hard to quantify, and there are many contributing factors, it is hard to 
dismiss the increase in political polarization after aggressive Republican redistricting measures 
following the 2010 census dramatically increased the number of “safe” seats among both parties 
across the country. See 2012 REDMAP Summary Report: How a Strategy of Targeting State Legislative 
Races in 2010 Led to a Republican U.S. House Majority in 2013, REPUBLICAN ST. LEADERSHIP COMM. 
(Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.redistrictingmajorityproject.com/?p=646 [https://perma.cc/68U5-ACDB] 
(describing the Republican redistricting strategy for state legislative races in 2010); see also Daley, 
supra note 26 (“You might even argue [the Republican gerrymander of 2011] worked too well, creating 
the solid conservative districts that gave rise to the renegade House Freedom Caucus, forced Speaker 
John Boehner out of office, and fomented the grass-roots anger that fueled Donald Trump’s ascent 
and punctured the GOP establishment.”); The Rise of Safe Seats: The Relative Impact of 
Redistricting and “The Big Sort,” CTR. FOR VOTING & DEMOCRACY (Nov. 2013), https:// 
d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/fairvote/pages/2412/attachments/original/1449515619/Redistricting
2014.pdf?1449515619 [https://perma.cc/P6RZ-S97L] (finding the number of congressional districts 
with balanced partisanship “has declined by nearly a third since 2010”); cf. Jamie L. Carson et al., 
Reevaluating the Effects of Redistricting on Electoral Competition, 1972–2012, 14 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 
165, 168 (2014) (finding that independent commission- and court-drawn legislative districts 
experience more competition than those drawn by legislatures). 
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1992 to 2012.30 Serving as House minority leader beginning in 2007, 
Armstrong was brash, outspoken, and increasingly a thorn in the side of 
General Assembly Republicans.31 During the redistricting process following 
the 2010 census, Republican House leadership decided to write him out of his 
own district by moving his Tenth District to Northern Virginia and thereby 
forcing him to run in the Sixth District against a strong Republican 
incumbent (and personal friend).32 Instead, Armstrong moved six miles to 
the newly drawn Ninth District to run against another Republican 
incumbent, also a strong, entrenched candidate. That incumbent received 
extensive financial backing from state GOP leadership and ultimately 
defeated Armstrong, who has declined to run again.33 
Individual targeting of this nature is rampant,34 and it raises a number of 
ethical issues that lie outside of the normal conversation surrounding 
redistricting. Should elected officials be allowed to target one another using 
what is essentially a procedural mechanism, in retaliation for taking certain 
positions or in order to protect their own electoral interests? Notwithstanding 
the Supreme Court’s reluctance to establish a standard for unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymandering, one can imagine that this is where a line could be 
drawn. Such practices smack of the kinds of unethical conduct routinely 
barred under government ethics law, such as legislators granting preferential 
treatment to a client or family member, or damaging a business rival.35  
Moreover, legislators who control redistricting have clear personal, 
financial, and professional interests in drawing the district lines to increase 
their chances of reelection—or all but assure it. These personal interests 
create the kind of conflicts of interests that many states have sought to 
eliminate via legislation prohibiting legislators from voting on matters in 
which they have a personal stake. 
 
30 Jim Nolan, GOP Targets Democratic Veteran Armstrong, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Sept. 11, 





34 Instances are too numerous to list, but in one example involving both inter- and intra-party 
favoritism by Illinois Democratic leadership, “[n]ot only did the Democrats who drew the lines pit 
more than two dozen Republican lawmakers against each other, they also carved out potential 
primary and general election challengers to the benefit of sitting Democrats.” Ray Long, Democrats 
Protect Their Own in State Legislative Remap: Party Shields Incumbents from Potential Foes, Lumps 
Republicans Together, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 9, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-08-09/ 
news/ct-met-legislative-remap-0809-20110809_1_democrats-collins-map [https://perma.cc/65X4-GPLX]. 
35 See Conflict of Interest Definitions, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/ethics/50-state-table-conflict-of-interest-definitions.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q6JV-KBC8] 
(describing the conflict of interest laws of each state). 
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II. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER REDISTRICTING  
AS CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
The legal concept of a conflict of interest36 with respect to public officials 
finds its origin in the Lockean ideal of government as a social contract, in 
which the public authorizes the government to act on its behalf and in its 
interest.37 Conflict of interest laws seek to preserve the public trust in the integrity 
of government institutions by prohibiting public officials from participating in 
decisionmaking processes that implicate their own private interests.38 
Although gerrymandering is, in many respects, a project of political 
parties, it is the legislators themselves that ultimately determine how the lines 
are drawn in the vast majority of states.39 These sitting legislators understand 
that how they draw district lines affects not only the overall partisan 
composition of the legislative body, but also their own prospects for 
reelection. Because legislators receive a salary and other benefits for serving, 
they have a personal financial interest in drawing the lines to substantially 
 
36 A conflict of interest is defined as a “situation in which a public official or fiduciary who, 
contrary to the obligation and absolute duty to act for the benefit of the public or a designated 
individual, exploits the relationship for personal benefit, typically pecuniary.” 3 WEST’S 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 84 (2d ed. 2005). 
37 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER 
CONCERNING TOLERATION 74 (C.H. Wilson & R.B. McCallum eds., Basil Blackwell 1948) (1690) 
(“[T]he legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the 
people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative when they find the legislative act contrary 
to the trust reposed in them . . . .”); see also id. at 71 (“These laws also ought to be designed for no 
other end ultimately but the good of the people.”). 
38 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 30-100 (2014) (“The General Assembly, recognizing that our 
system of representative government is dependent in part upon (i) citizen legislative members 
representing fully the public in the legislative process and (ii) its citizens maintaining the highest 
trust in their public officers, finds and declares that the citizens are entitled to be assured that the 
judgment of the members of the General Assembly will not be compromised or affected by 
inappropriate conflicts.”). 
39 Thirty-seven states give state legislators direct control over redistricting, seven states have 
created political redistricting commissions comprised of a mix of legislators and appointees 
(typically appointed by the Governor and/or a court), and six states have adopted independent 
redistricting commissions, which do not include legislators or other elected officials. State-by-State 
Redistricting Procedures, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State-by-state_redistricting_procedures 
[https://perma.cc/5DC3-MDWB]. 
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benefit their own reelection prospects.40 This personal interest conflicts with 
their ethical, and in many cases legal, duty to serve the public interest.41 
Most states have passed government ethics laws or other provisions 
prohibiting legislators from taking legislative actions concerning matters in 
which they have a personal interest, or at least requiring them to disclose that 
such an interest exists.42 Some states define what might constitute a personal 
interest quite narrowly, limiting it to, for instance, a financial interest in a 
“contract, sale, purchase or service” involving the agency of which they are a 
part,43 or an ownership stake in a firm that may be affected by a legislative 
act.44 Other provisions prohibit only instances in which a legislator will derive 
a “direct”45 or “immediate”46 monetary benefit or loss as the result of a 
particular matter before the legislature. However, many states’ conflicts of 
interest laws and constitutional provisions contain much broader language. 
New York’s Public Officers Law, for instance, declares that “[n]o . . . member 
of the legislature or legislative employee should have any interest, financial 
or otherwise, direct or indirect . . . which is in substantial conflict with the 
proper discharge of his duties in the public interest.”47 Washington uses 
almost identical language to describe “[a]ctivities incompatible with public 
 
40 In fact, legislators can often draw district lines with such precision as to all but assure 
reelection. See, e.g., Hanh Quach & Dena Bunis, All Bow to Redistrict Architect: Politics Secretive, 
Single-Minded Michael Berman Holds All the Crucial Cards, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Aug. 26, 2001) 
http://archive.fairvote.org/redistricting/reports/remanual/canews4.htm#architect [https://perma.cc/NT55-
MRL2] (“[Michael Berman, a consultant hired by California Democratic state legislators to formulate a 
redistricting plan,] can move the boundaries and squeeze a sitting lawmaker out of his or her safely nested 
seat. Or he can create a district so loaded with Democratic voters that no Republican candidate has a 
chance. . . . ‘Twenty thousand is nothing to keep your seat,’ [Representative Loretta] Sanchez said. ‘I spend 
$2 million (campaigning) every election. If my colleagues are smart, they’ll pay their $20,000, and Michael 
[Berman] will draw the district they can win in. Those who have refused to pay? God help them.’”). 
41 Although many legislative acts can be said to implicate such a conflict, actions directed 
toward insulating the legislator from electoral accountability, such as gerrymandering or voter 
suppression, are fundamentally different from actions directed toward gaining the support of the 
electorate, and far more suspect. 
42 See supra note 39; see also Voting Recusal Provisions, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-table-voting-recusal-provisions.aspx [https://perma.cc/62R7-
HE7E] (cataloguing regulations and procedures for handling conflicts of interest). 
43 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-503(A) (2016). 
44 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-13(g) (West 2016) (“‘Interest’ means (1) the ownership or 
control of more than 10% of the profits or assets of a firm, association, or partnership, or more than 
10% of the stock in a corporation for profit other than a professional service corporation . . . or (2) 
the ownership or control of more than 1% of the profits of a firm, association, or partnership, or more 
than 1% of the stock in any corporation, which is the holder of, or an applicant for, a casino license 
or in any holding or intermediary company with respect thereto . . . .”). 
45 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-85 (West 2016). 
46 COLO. H. RULE. 21. 
47 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 74(2) (McKinney 2008). 
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duties.”48 Wisconsin’s conflict of interest prohibition states that “no state 
public official may . . . [u]se his or her office or position in a way that produces 
or assists in the production of a substantial benefit, direct or indirect, for the 
official,”49 but notably exempts from the prohibition “any action concerning 
the lawful payment of salaries or employee benefits.”50 
Louisiana law provides that “[i]f any elected official, in the discharge of a 
duty or responsibility of his office or position, would be required to vote on 
a matter which vote would be a violation of R.S. 42:1112,[51] he shall recuse 
himself from voting.”52 The state constitutions of Alabama,53 Colorado,54 
Kentucky,55 Oklahoma,56 Pennsylvania,57 Texas,58 and Washington59 contain 
almost identical provisions requiring any member of the legislature who has 
a “personal or private interest” in a matter before the legislature to disclose 
that interest and recuse themselves from voting on the matter. 
 
48 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.52.020 (West 2016) (“No state officer or state employee 
may have an interest, financial or otherwise, direct or indirect . . . that is in conflict with the proper 
discharge of the state officer’s or state employee’s official duties.”). 
49 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.46(1)(b) (West 2016). 
50 Id. § 19.46(3). 
51 See LA. STAT. ANN. § 42:1112(a) (2016) (providing that “[n]o public servant . . . shall 
participate in a transaction in which he has a personal substantial economic interest of which he may 
be reasonably expected to know involving the governmental entity”). 
52 Id. § 42:1120. 
53 See ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 82 (“A member of the legislature who has a personal or private 
interest in any measure or bill proposed or pending before the legislature, shall disclose the fact to 
the house of which he is a member, and shall not vote thereon.”). 
54 See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 43 (“A member who has a personal or private interest in any 
measure or bill proposed or pending before the general assembly, shall disclose the fact to the house 
of which he is a member, and shall not vote thereon.”); see also COLO. S. RULE 41(b)(1) (“Subject to 
article V, section 43, of the state constitution, a Senator has the right to vote upon all questions 
before the Senate and to participate in the business of the Senate and its committees, and, in so 
doing, is presumed to act in good faith and in the public interest. When a personal interest conflicts 
with the public interest and tends to affect the Senator’s independence of judgment, legislative 
activities are subject to limitations. Where any such conflict exists, it disqualifies the Senator from 
voting upon any question and from attempting to influence any legislation to which it relates.”). 
55 See KY. CONST. § 57 (“A member who has a personal or private interest in any measure or 
bill proposed or pending before the General Assembly, shall disclose the fact to the House of which 
he is a member, and shall not vote thereon upon pain of expulsion.”). 
56 See OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 24 (“A member of the Legislature, who has a personal or private 
interest in any measure or bill, proposed or pending before the Legislature, shall disclose the fact to 
the House of which he is a member, and shall not vote thereon.”). 
57 See PA. CONST. art. III, § 13 (“A member who has a personal or private interest in any 
measure or bill proposed or pending before the General Assembly shall disclose the fact to the 
House of which he is a member, and shall not vote thereon.”). 
58 See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 22 (“A member who has a personal or private interest in any 
measure or bill, proposed, or pending before the Legislature, shall disclose the fact to the House, of 
which he is a member, and shall not vote thereon.”). 
59 See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 30 (“A member who has a private interest in any bill or measure 
proposed or pending before the legislature, shall disclose the fact to the house of which he is a 
member, and shall not vote thereon.”). 
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It is unlikely that the framers of these laws and provisions would have 
envisioned them being applied to conflicts of interest arising in the context 
of redistricting. However, legislators do in fact have substantial personal, 
financial, and professional interests in the outcomes of redistricting 
proposals—interests that may conflict with their ethical and legal obligation 
to act in good faith and consistent with the public interest. 
III. THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
      CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ACT 
Virginia’s conflicts of interest law may be particularly well suited to the 
redistricting context because it specifically defines personal interest to include 
salary and benefits paid by the legislature and lacks much of the limiting 
language often found in similar laws. 
A. Background and Relevant Provisions 
Enacted in 1970, the Rules and Conflicts of Interest Act was the first 
comprehensive statute in Virginia governing the conflicts of interest of 
government officials, replacing thirty-eight separate state laws.60 The product 
of a major study undertaken by a governor-appointed commission, the Act’s 
passage also coincided with the drafting of Virginia’s 1971 Constitution, which 
granted the legislature explicit authority “to prevent conflicts of interest.”61 
The 1970 Act required government officials to “disqualify [themselves] 
from voting or participating in any official action in which [they] may have a 
material financial interest,”62 but did not apply to General Assembly members 
until 1987 when separate acts were passed governing General Assembly 
members and state and local officials and employees.63 The heart of the 1987 
Virginia General Assembly Conflicts of Interest Act (hereinafter the Act) was 
its requirement that General Assembly members abstain from voting 
whenever the member “has a personal interest in a transaction.”64 
Following the public corruption investigation and charges against former 
Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell and his wife in 2014, the Virginia General 
Assembly altered how the Act deals with gifts, changed the composition of 
the Virginia Conflicts of Interest and Ethics Advisory Council, and updated 
 
60 Mary R. Spain, A Legislator’s Guide to Conflicts of Interests and Rules of Conduct 4, 12-13 (2009), 
http://dls.virginia.gov/pubs/ConflictInterestGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9UE-9Z6J]. 
61 Id. at 3. 
62 Id. at 4. 
63 Id. at 5. 
64 Id. 
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certain disclosure requirements.65 The Council provides training and 
guidance to legislators, issues formal advisory opinions, assists with the filing 
of disclosure reports, and approves travel waivers, but lacks any investigative 
or adjudicative powers.66 
The Act’s central purpose is to increase public confidence in the 
legislature by preventing legislators—who serve part-time for a modest salary 
and who may have external personal financial interests that would be affected 
by matters under consideration by the General Assembly—from having their 
judgment influenced by “inappropriate conflicts.”67 The Act’s “Declaration of 
legislative policy; construction” reads, 
The General Assembly, recognizing that our system of representative 
government is dependent in part upon (i) citizen legislative members 
representing fully the public in the legislative process and (ii) its citizens 
maintaining the highest trust in their public officers, finds and declares that 
the citizens are entitled to be assured that the judgment of the members of 
the General Assembly will not be compromised or affected by inappropriate 
conflicts. . . . This chapter shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose.68 
Implicit here is a recognition that legislators cannot, in good faith, represent 
the public interest on matters in which they have a personal financial interest. 
The rest of the Act codifies this purpose. Section 30-108 provides that “[a] 
legislator who has a personal interest in a transaction shall disqualify himself 
from participating in the transaction.”69 This means that while a legislator 
may participate in discussions and debates, “he [may] not vote on the 
transaction in which he has a personal interest.”70 In turn, section 30-101 
defines a “personal interest” as, 
a financial benefit or liability accruing to a legislator or to a member of his 
immediate family. Such interest shall exist by reason of . . . salary, other 
compensation, fringe benefits, or benefits from the use of property, or any 
combination thereof, paid or provided by a business or governmental agency that 
exceeds, or may reasonably be anticipated to exceed, $5,000 annually . . . .71 
 
65 Ethics Reform Overhaul Passes, VA. ASS’N COUNTIES (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.vaco.org/ 
ethics-reform-overhaul-passes/ [https://perma.cc/URT3-WANU]. 
66 Id. 
67 VA. CODE ANN. § 30-100 (West 2014). 
68 Id. (emphasis added). 
69 Id. § 30-108 (West 2014). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. § 30-101 (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
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Because a House Delegate’s salary is $17,640 per year and a Senator’s salary is 
$18,000,72 and because these legislative bodies are governmental agencies,73 
the salaries for all Virginia state legislators qualify as a “personal interest” 
under the Act. 
The Act then goes on to define, with greater specificity, “personal interest 
in a transaction” to mean “a personal interest of a legislator in any matter 
considered by the General Assembly.”74 It notes, 
Such personal interest exists when an officer . . . has a personal interest in 
property or a business, or represents or provides services to any individual or 
business and such property, business or represented or served individual or 
business (i) is the subject of the transaction or (ii) may realize a reasonably 
foreseeable direct or indirect benefit or detriment as a result of the action of 
the agency considering the transaction. A “personal interest in a transaction” 
exists only if the legislator . . . is affected in a way that is substantially 
different from the general public or from . . . [a] class or group of which he 
or the individual or business he represents or serves is a member.75 
Finally, it defines a “[t]ransaction” to mean “any matter considered by the 
General Assembly, whether in a committee, subcommittee, or other entity of 
the General Assembly or before the General Assembly itself, on which official 
action is taken or contemplated.”76 
A point of contention may arise concerning whether the above language 
narrows the definition of “personal interest” to encompass only “a personal 
interest in property or a business” affected by the transaction.77 However, such 
an interpretation would render superfluous the preceding language 
encompassing salary and benefits among several other forms of nonproperty, 
nonbusiness-related interests.78 In addition, the immediate juxtaposition of 
the inclusive phrase “such personal interest exists when” with the exclusive 
phrase “a personal interest in a transaction exists only if” indicates that the 
language referring to property and business interests here is more likely 
intended to define further the circumstances under which one particularly 
common type of personal financial interest creates a conflict, rather than as a 
 
72 Dave Ress, Part 1: A Part-Time Legislature With-Full Time Rewards, DAILY PRESS (Nov. 18, 
2014), http://www.dailypress.com/news/politics/dp-nws-virginiaway-overview-20141116-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/45B7-7BFG]. 
73 See VA. CODE ANN. § 30-101 (defining “governmental agency” to include “each component 




77 See supra text accompanying notes 71, 75. 
78 See supra text accompanying note 71.  
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limitation on the overall definition of what may constitute a “personal 
interest.”79 
The real limiting factor here is the provision stating that a personal 
interest in a transaction exists only when a legislator may be affected by the 
outcome of a transaction in a way that is “substantially different from the 
general public or from persons comprising a profession . . . or other 
comparable and generally recognizable class or group of which he . . . is a 
member.”80 This provision essentially creates an exception to the prohibition 
on legislators voting on matters in which they have a personal interest for 
situations in which the legislative outcome may affect that interest, but in a 
way that is not “substantially different” from any other similarly situated 
person and thus does not raise the kinds of concerns about legislative 
objectivity that the Act aims to address. Legislators running for reelection 
are members of a class that includes other legislative candidates or, more 
narrowly, candidates running for their individual seat. Because a sitting 
legislator-as-candidate may gain a significant electoral advantage over 
another member of this candidate class through the adoption of a given 
redistricting measure, this should qualify as “substantially different” for the 
purposes of the above provision. 
Taken together, the provisions of the Act suggest that a legislator’s 
personal interest in retaining their own salary should preclude them from 
voting on matters that affect their own prospects for reelection and thus, at 
minimum, on any redistricting measure in which their district has been redrawn. 
B. Legal Strategy 
Given the language81 and purpose of the Act, it should be possible to 
allege that any member of the General Assembly who is running for 
reelection and who casts a vote on a redistricting proposal that alters his or 
her district has violated the Act. It may also be possible to allege a violation 
if it can be shown that a sitting member plans to run for election in the future, 
even absent plans to run in the next election, so long as the redistricting 
proposal would be in effect when he or she runs. 
A more promising approach might be to argue that, because the vast 
majority of General Assembly members are barred from participating in 
 
79 See supra text accompanying notes 74–75. Note that in Virginia, “little is available to 
determine legislative intent compared to other states or to the congressional level. There are no 
official transcripts of the House and Senate debates or the proceedings of the standing committees.” 
Legislative History in Virginia, LIBR. VA. http://www.lva.virginia.gov/public/guides/leg_his.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7Q28-K8PC]. 
80 VA. CODE ANN. § 30-101. 
81 “The language of the Act” is to be “liberally construed to accomplish its purpose.” Id. § 30-100. 
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redistricting matters under the Act due to their status as candidates running 
for public office, the General Assembly as a body is not well-situated to 
effectively control redistricting and thus must divest itself of the authority. 
To establish standing, plaintiffs would likely need to be former legislators 
who were drawn out of their districts (such as Mr. Armstrong), or candidates, 
including incumbents, who can show that the districts in which they are running 
have been drawn in a way that gives their opponents an insurmountable 
advantage over them.82 It may also be possible for voters within a gerrymandered 
district to establish standing on the theory that such partisan gerrymandering 
violates the compactness and contiguity requirements of the Constitution of 
Virginia83 and causes them direct harm as a result.84 These voters could then 
assert that the General Assembly’s redistricting authority itself violates the 
Act’s requirement that personally interested members abstain from voting on 
the composition of their own districts. 
One potential obstacle that any legal challenge would need to address 
concerns the dual doctrines of legislative immunity and privilege. Under the 
Constitution of Virginia, members of the General Assembly are “privileged 
from arrest” during the legislative session or the fifteen days before and after 
the session, except in cases of “treason, felony, or breach of the peace”—legislative 
immunity.85 In addition, “any speech or debate in either house shall not be 
questioned in any other place”—legislative privilege.86 
However, the Constitution also states that “nothing in this Constitution 
shall limit the power of the General Assembly to prevent conflict of interests, 
dual officeholding, or other incompatible activities by elective or appointive 
officials of the Commonwealth or of any political subdivision.”87 This 
provision appears to circumvent an assertion that legislative immunity under 
the Virginia Constitution allows a legislator to avoid being bound by conflict 
of interest laws enacted by the General Assembly, even when such laws 
govern conduct, such as voting, otherwise covered by legislative immunity 
 
82 See Cupp v. Bd. of Supervisors, 318 S.E.2d 407, 411 (Va. 1984) (holding that a litigant has 
standing if she has “a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the case so that the parties will be 
actual adversaries and the issues will be fully and faithfully developed”). 
83 See VA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (setting out the compactness and contiguity requirements). 
84 See Wilkins v. West, 571 S.E.2d 100, 107 (Va. 2002) (holding that residents of 
unconstitutional districts have standing because they are affected in a way that gives rise to the 
“inference of particularized injury”). 
85 VA. CONST. art. IV, § 9. 
86 Id. The Virginia Supreme Court recently interpreted the “speech or debate” clause to shield internal 
legislative research documents from a subpoena on the basis that they constituted “communication regarding 
a core legislative function.” Edwards v. Vesilind, 790 S.E.2d 469, 480 (Va. 2016). 
87 VA. CONST. art. II, § 5(c). 
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where a conflict of interest is not implicated.88 Thus, a legal challenge brought 
under the Act is unlikely to be vulnerable to an assertion of legislative immunity. 
C. Possible Remedies 
Plaintiffs in an action challenging legislative redistricting under the Act 
could request a number of remedies, some more suitable than others. The Act 
itself provides for criminal and civil penalties including a finding of guilt of 
a Class 1 misdemeanor, forfeiture of money derived from a violation, and 
assessment of fines equal to the amount of money forfeited.89 However, the 
more appropriate remedy would be some form of injunction preventing all or 
part of the legislature from voting on a pending redistricting measure, or 
ordering the General Assembly to adopt new redistricting procedures that 
comport with the Act’s requirements. 
On one end of the spectrum, plaintiffs could request an injunction barring 
any individual member of the Virginia legislature running for reelection from 
voting on redistricting measures that alter his or her district. As suggested 
above, however, relief of this form would leave few members available to vote, 
which itself seems to confer an unacceptable amount of power on the few 
members of the legislature not running for reelection. Such relief could also 
result in a perverse situation where each party designates certain members to 
not seek reelection after a census year just so those members would be eligible 
to vote on redistricting measures. 
At the other end of the spectrum, plaintiffs could request an injunction 
ordering the General Assembly as a whole to remove itself from the 
redistricting process. Other states have achieved similar ends via statute, with 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, and Washington establishing 
independent commissions to draw the lines.90 Regulations in these states 
limit or eliminate direct participation by elected officials in the redistricting 
process.91 Other states have set up special redistricting commissions that 
include both legislators and non-legislators,92 which would be an acceptable 
 
88 There is no case law addressing the question of whether a legislature can collectively waive 
legislative immunity in certain contexts via constitutional provision. However, the language of 
Article II, Section 5(c)—“nothing in this Constitution shall limit the power of the General Assembly 
to prevent conflict of interests . . . by elective . . . officials of the Commonwealth”—seems 
sufficiently “explicit and unequivocal” so as to satisfy the Supreme Court’s lofty standard. United 
States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 491 (1979). 
89 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 30-123, 30-126 (West 2014). 
90 State-by-State Redistricting Procedures, BALLOTPEDIA (Jan. 2017), https://ballotpedia.org/ 
State-by-state_redistricting_procedures [https://perma.cc/6V58-75QW]. The Supreme Court has 
held that such independent redistricting commissions are constitutional. Ariz. State Legislature v. 
Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2671 (2015). 
91 BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 90. 
92 Id. 
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remedy here if it could be shown that such a commission sufficiently insulates 
the individual legislators from the actual line-drawing responsibilities so as 
to mitigate their conflict of interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Legislative control over redistricting creates conflicts between the 
personal interests of sitting legislators and the public interest they are 
charged with serving. While the Supreme Court has held that it is 
constitutional for legislators to draw their own districts in ways that advance 
their personal interests, and has yet to adopt a standard for determining an 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, state conflicts of interest laws and 
constitutional provisions offer a new legal avenue through which to challenge 
this practice. Without any precedent dealing with conflicts of interest law in 
the context of redistricting, it is difficult to anticipate how a court would 
adjudicate such a claim. However, the language and purpose of these laws and 
provisions, as well as the inability of existing legal frameworks to adequately 
address the problem of partisan gerrymandering, suggest that such an 
approach is worth pursuing. 
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